Scenario planning for transport practitioners by Lyons, Glenn et al.
Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives 11 (2021) 100438
2590-1982/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Scenario planning for transport practitioners 
Glenn Lyons a,*, Charlene Rohr b, Annette Smith c, Anna Rothnie d, Andrew Curry e 
a Centre for Transport & Society, University of the West of England, Frenchay Campus, Bristol BS16 1QY, United Kingdom 
b Mott MacDonald, 22 Station Rd, Cambridge CB1 2JD, United Kingdom 
c Mott MacDonald, Home Based, United Kingdom 
d Mott MacDonald, 10 Temple Back, Redcliffe, Bristol BS1 6FL, United Kingdom 
e School of International Futures, Onega House, 112 Main Road, Sidcup, Kent DA14 6NE, United Kingdom   






A B S T R A C T   
Scenario planning helps in contemplating how the future may develop and can be especially important when 
needing to make sense of uncertainty – something now pertinent to the transport sector. 
Accordingly, scenario planning is moving from the periphery of strategic transport planning towards becoming 
a more normalised and integral contribution. By examining rather than ignoring a range of uncertainties about 
the future, scenarios can be developed that enable an exploration of different futures, in turn improving transport 
planning. Scenarios can be narrative based, represented quantitatively, or combine ‘storytelling and number 
crunching’. Both the process of creating them and of representing the scenarios, deepen an appreciation of 
uncertainty about the future. In turn this allows planners and policymakers to better understand potential 
outcomes and challenges and determine how to address these. Scenarios can also be used to identify and assess 
candidate measures for influencing the transport system, testing these against a range of uncertain future con-
ditions. This helps to identify measures that together can help form a strategy that is more robust. 
Drawing upon the combined experience of its authors, this paper provides insights into the development of 
scenarios and their use to improve decision making in transport planning. It offers advice on how to help ensure 
the scenario development process is credible, how to produce a coherent set of scenarios and how to ensure they 
are used to engage key stakeholders and to enable policymakers to confidently develop their strategic thinking 
and plans.   
1. Introduction 
Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, planning for future transport 
needs was complex, requiring an understanding of multiple interlinking 
social, economic, and technological issues. Where might people want to 
live, how and where might they work, shop and play in future? What 
means might be available to support how people, goods, jobs, services 
and opportunities are accessed in future, and how might they support a 
diverse population? 
Past trends are a partial guide to addressing such questions. How-
ever, trends change, and can be changed. For example, changes in 
working from home, retail behaviour or how people feel about living in 
crowded cities may introduce unexpected future dynamics. New, as yet 
unencountered, technological innovations can further cloud any sense 
about what the future has in store. For example, if (fully) autonomous 
vehicles became mainstream (uncertain in itself), we simply do not 
know how this would change the transport system - from infrastructure 
supply, through the nature of demand and use, to impacts on different 
modes of travel and on where people live, shop, work and play. Thus, we 
are faced with a need to plan under deep uncertainty. 
In its recently published Uncertainty Toolkit, the UK Department for 
Transport considers, in the context of decision making, uncertainty to be 
“the gap between available knowledge and the knowledge decision 
makers would need to make the best, most informed policy decision” 
(DfT, 2021: 8). Uncertainty is a state of mind and in that sense is sub-
jective. The future is inherently uncertain. Each of us weigh up risks 
associated with decisions and outcomes. We judge probabilities in that 
risk assessment. However, if the probabilities are not known or know-
able then we are faced with what is called deep uncertainty. For group 
decision making, this has been described as not knowing or agreeing 
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upon: “(i) the external context of the system, (ii) how the system works 
and its boundaries, and/or (iii) the outcomes of interest from the system 
and/or their relative importance (Lempert et al. 2003)” (Marchau et al, 
2019: 2). 
As a result of a much greater sense of deep uncertainty prior to but 
amplified further by the pandemic, doubt has been cast over the ability 
of ‘business as usual’ transport planning to support robust decision 
making that can assure positive outcomes from investment decisions and 
interventions. Growing attention has been turning to approaches that 
can help ‘open out’, explore and accommodate (‘close down’) deep 
uncertainty in support of decision making (Lyons and Marsden, 2021). 
One such approach is scenario planning. This is notable for its now 
famous early use by the Shell Oil Company to “anticipate the various oil 
crises of the early 1970s and to come through those in better shape than 
did competitors” (Menzies and Middleton, 2020: 42). 
With awareness of a growing interest in and use of scenario planning 
in transport, this paper aims to help transport practitioners by providing 
insight into what scenarios are, the process of developing them and the 
purpose they can serve. A single article cannot provide a complete ‘how 
to’ guide to developing and using scenarios, but the paper offers a basis 
for those already engaged with scenarios to reflect and for those curious 
about the possible merits of scenario analysis in transport planning to 
begin their journey of discovery. This is done through addressing a series 
of what we consider to be some central and commonly asked questions. 
As authors we have collective experience, over many years, in under-
taking scenario development and planning in the transport sector (and 
beyond). There is also a rich literature to draw upon in terms of meth-
odological insights and lessons from application. We draw together, 
from the literature and our own experience, what we hope is a useful 
point of reference to help others in their own (ongoing) engagement 
with scenario planning in the transport sector. 
The next section builds upon this introduction to address what sce-
nario planning is and why it is applied. This is followed by an exami-
nation of some of the history of scenario planning in the transport sector 
before moving to the ten questions we address. To conclude, we 
contemplate the future – of transport planning’s handling of uncertainty 
in a changing world. Please note – in this paper our focus is principally 
upon explorative possible future scenarios as opposed to preferred future 
scenarios (visions). 
2. The origins and rationale of scenario planning 
The futurist Roy Amara distinguishes between “the art of the 
‘possible’”, “the science of the ‘probable’” and “the politics of the 
‘preferable’” (Amara, 1991: 646) in looking at futures. These three forms 
of futures reflect a history of futures work and define the space from 
which scenario development and scenario planning emerged. 
The modern history of futures work goes back to the immediate post- 
war period, and – broadly - emerged from two different traditions 
(Curry, in press; see also Chermack et al, 2001). In the United States, the 
research organisations RAND and SRI (originally the Stanford Research 
Institute), both significantly funded by the US Department of Defense, 
built on wartime planning methods, and developed methods that used 
probabilistic and trends-based approaches to identifying probable fu-
tures. In Europe, people such as Fred Polak in the Netherlands and 
Gaston Berger in France evolved contrasting approaches that were 
designed to rebuild their societies. These can be thought of as preferred 
futures. Between these two is a gap, although it took some time before 
the idea of possible futures emerged. 
While at RAND, Herman Kahn had used game theoretic models to 
identify the possible outcomes of nuclear war, and he developed these 
when he left RAND to set up the Hudson Institute. The Hudson Institute, 
in turn, influenced a generation of planners through its corporate pro-
gramme. Shell, famous for applying scenarios to the business challenges 
of the oil sector in the 1970 s (notably involving Pierre Wack (Wack, 
1985a; Wack, 1985b; Kleiner, 1996; Wilkinson and Kupers, 2013), 
learnt from the Hudson Institute and combined this with the French La 
Prospective approach. SRI designed a four-scenario method that it called 
a “scenario parameter matrix” in the 1970s in which scenarios reflect 
“the expected future, the worst case, the best case, and a highly different 
alternative” (Bishop et al., 2007: 12). In a study costing $225,000 (1970s 
prices) the scenarios aside from the expected future were named “foul 
weather future”, “disciplined society future” and “transformation 
future” and the SRI study was considered by Senator Proxmire to have 
squandered public money in the face of “a government that can barely 
decide transportation policy under current conditions” (Shapley, 1977: 
1165) – a sign of how far scenario planning has come in the decades 
since. This method in turn influenced the 2x2 scenarios method (see 
later - Fig. 2, Section 4.1) popularised by Global Business Network in the 
1990s (Curry, 2012). 
In addition to possible futures, plausible futures are also discussed in 
scenario planning literature, although not well defined (see Section 4.6). 
From a transport perspective the DfT Uncertainty Toolkit emphasises the 
nuance of distinction between plausible and possible as follows. “Sce-
nario analysis is a process of analysing future events by considering 
several alternative possible outcomes. Each scenario outcome and 
pathway should, however, be plausible” (DfT, 2021). Hines and Bishop 
(2013) emphasise that while it can be argued that “almost anything is 
possible”, scenarios should have some foundation in the present for 
suggesting that they could come about, such as the existence of weak 
signals. 
The Futures Cone shown in Fig. 1 is helpful, in our experience, in 
offering a reminder that given inherent uncertainty (of whatever degree) 
in looking to the future, any representation of the future is a subjective 
view based upon assumptions that determine where we look and what 
we see. We return in Section 4.6 to the matter of judging reasonable 
bounds of possibility. Bounds of possibility can include wildcard events 
(Pillkahn, 2008) – high impact events, such as a pandemic, which may 
(or may not) be unanticipated but which can be dramatic in terms of 
their effect upon the system under consideration. 
Creating robust approaches to building “multiple types of hypo-
thetical futures” (McBride et al., 2017: 6) has always been a challenge. 
Wendell Bell notes that “scenarios can be produced by any and all of the 
specific methods used by futurists” (Bell, 2004: 316). As a result, there 
are scores of methods (see Bishop et al., 2007), and some 400 attempts at 
defining what a scenario is (Spaniol and Rowland, 2019). This is because 
scenarios serve different purposes, and so are developed in different 
ways and take different forms. 
However, what all the methods have in common is that they are 
designed to imagine multiple possible futures, and therefore to provide a 
framework to assess how to act in the present. The scenarios themselves 
are not the destination. 
3. Scenario planning in the transport sector 
The transport sector is no stranger to scenario planning, or at least to 
scenario development. In this section we briefly mention some examples 
with which we have been associated (there are plentiful further exam-
ples undertaken by others). 
At the dawn of a new millennium it was in vogue to look to the 
future. In 2000 the Transport Visions Network explored the future of 
society and lifestyles through a set of six scenarios as a means to better 
appreciate the uncertainty and possibilities affecting derived travel de-
mand (Lyons et al., 2002). In the very early 2000s, the UK Department 
for Transport commissioned work to review examples of scenario sets 
that had been developed internationally and choose a 2x2 set for 2030 
that could be used in conjunction with the National Transport Model to 
explore uncertainty and travel demand implications (Chatterjee and 
Gordon, 2006). Shortly after this study, the UK Government’s Foresight 
Unit undertook a very substantial piece of work looking out to 2050 at 
the future of transport and technology (OST, 2006). Not only did this 
create a 2x2 set of scenarios but this was preceded by state-of-science 
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reviews and complemented by systems thinking. 
In 2014 the New Zealand Ministry of Transport explored uncertainty 
about the future of demand for car travel and developed a 2x2 set of 
scenarios (see Fig. 2 in Section 4.1) (Lyons et al, 2014). Social research at 
a similar time examined the future of mobility in an ageing society using 
a 2x2 scenario set (Shergold et al, 2015). 
What is notable with all the examples above is that they sat on the 
periphery of transport planning practice. The scenarios developed were 
explorative in terms of uncertainty over the future and were developed 
with policy implications in mind. However, they were not used directly 
in the policymaking process or to directly consider the robustness of 
specific policies or interventions. Chermack and Coons (2012) argue 
that it is use of scenarios that matters most. As such it may be more 
appropriate to consider the studies above as examples of scenario 
development rather than scenario planning (Bishop et al. (2007) note the 
common confusion between, and inappropriate conflation of, scenario 
development and scenario planning). The scenarios helped those 
exposed to them to think, but not necessarily to make policy decisions. 
The prevalence of the classic 2x2 approach to the scenario development 
is also apparent. 
More recently, this has changed. Scenarios are being developed and 
directly used in the policymaking process, as illustrated in the UK ex-
amples below. In 2015/2016, Innovate UK commissioned the develop-
ment of a set of scenarios to explore the role of future technology for 
future transport, and be used to explore potential impacts on different 
stakeholders in society and consider policy interventions that were 
robust across a range of scenarios (Rohr et al., 2016). The scenario 
development process used the framework presented in Gausemeier et al. 
(1998), which combines expert opinion, gathered via in-person work-
shops, with cross-impact analysis, consistency analysis and cluster 
analysis using specialised computer support (see further in Section 4.8). 
As authors we are all part of a team led by Mott MacDonald that has 
been providing futures support to the Department for Transport (DfT) 
since the start of 2019. The purpose of this engagement is to support 
DfT’s wish to improve the robustness of its decision making in the face of 
uncertainty across its policymaking areas, using a range of futures 
methods (GOS, 2017), and scenario planning in particular. Scenarios are 
being used to help stress-test candidate policy measures or interventions 
in terms of how they may perform (in relation to preferred outcomes) in 
different plausible future contexts. 
In 2020 Transport Scotland published its revised National Transport 
Strategy (Transport Scotland, 2020). Its underlying thinking and 
formulation have been informed by a scenario planning tool and process 
designed to expose the policymaking to stress-testing using eight plau-
sible future contexts with qualitatively and quantitatively represented 
scenarios (Lyons et al, 2018; Ruscoe et al., 2019). In England, the sub- 
national transport body Transport for the North adopted a similar 
approach in developing four future travel demand scenarios to be used 
Fig. 1. Futures Cone (For the history of the futures cone see https://thevoroscope.com/2017/02/24/the-futures-cone-use-and-history/).  
Fig. 2. Scenarios examining the future demand for car travel (based upon Lyons and Davidson, 2016: Fig. 1).  
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in its strategic transport planning and business case development (TfN, 
2020). In the DfT’s Uncertainty Toolkit (DfT, 2021) is an expectation 
that major scheme proposals will be appraised against a set of six ‘off- 
the-shelf’ Common Analytical Scenarios. This supplementary transport 
analysis guidance is testament to scenario planning becoming a per-
manent fixture of UK transport planning and policymaking. 
With the preceding scene setting in mind, we now turn to a more 
detailed examination of the practice of scenario development and 
planning. 
4. Lessons from scenario planning application 
In this section we address ten central and commonly asked questions 
about scenario development and their use: 
What is a scenario? 
Why or when are scenarios worth developing? 
Who should be involved in developing scenarios, how and why? 
How is the scope of a set of scenarios clarified? 
Do scenarios have to be tailored to a particular application? 
How far should the bounds of future possibility be stretched? 
How many variables are needed and how many scenarios? 
How are the scenarios developed? 
How is a scenario brought to life? 
How much time and effort are needed for scenario development? 
4.1. What is a scenario? 
In broad terms a scenario can be considered an “intelligible 
description of a possible situation in the future based on a complex 
network of influence factors” (Gausemeier et al., 1998: 115). This 
description may be in terms of a distinct set of measures of interest or a 
richer socio-technical portrayal of the future that invites imagination 
and immersion. 
A scenario can be a representation of aspects of the future ranging 
from those over which the party concerned has direct influence or 
control to those over which it has little or no control (the latter 
addressing the external environment within which the party wishes to 
operate or consider the operation of others). 
Representation can be quantitative (e.g. DfT, 2018), qualitative (e.g. 
GOS, 2019) or one that combines narrative and numbers (e.g. Lyons and 
Davidson, 2016; TfN, 2020; Transport Scotland, 2020). Wider repre-
sentations include vivid images, physical artefacts and theatrical 
improvisation (Curry and Schultz, 2009) (see further in Section 4.9). 
Scenarios are typically developed in sets when used to expose and 
explore uncertainty, thereby enabling contrast and possibility to be 
depicted and considered further. Fig. 2 shows an example of a 2x2 set of 
plausible scenarios in pictorial form. This depiction includes numerical 
estimates of percent change in total car traffic (vehicle distance trav-
elled) between 2014 and each 2042 scenario as a means of fortification 
of the narrative. Numbers “characterise corporate cultures” (Wilkinson 
and Kupers, 2013) and can be powerful and grab attention when used 
alongside narrative. To quote Shell’s Chief Economist (1993–1997), 
DeAnne Julius, “[e]ngineers are numbers people, and if you can’t 
quantify what you are talking about, they tend to dismiss you as inter-
esting (at best) mystics” (Wilkinson and Kupers, 2013). 
4.2. Why or when are scenarios worth developing? 
In essence, scenarios make you think (challenging current thinking 
and ‘thinking about the unthinkable’ (Kahn, 1962; Chermack et al, 
2001)). They are able to help, through their development and use, in 
enabling decision makers to be “wise before the event”, as opposed to 
being “wise after the event” (WRR, 1992). With such motivations in 
mind, we set out below three reasons for developing scenarios. 
To better understand the future: the act of developing scenarios pro-
vides an opportunity to bring together a wide range of stakeholders to 
“broaden conventional thinking, enhance understanding and generate 
new insights relevant to taking meaningful action in complex dynamic 
systems” (McBride et al., 2017: 1). Further, Franco and Montibellar 
argue that participating in such exercises increases commitment for 
implementation (Wright et al., 2019). 
To improve planning and policy making: a further aim of developing 
scenarios is to improve decision making by helping to identify and test 
shaping actions to support policy objectives and mitigation actions to 
counteract potential challenges to these objectives. In this regard, sce-
narios can help to: (i) explore different ways that the area of interest may 
develop in future; (ii) consider how key actors – governments, busi-
nesses, citizens - may be influenced and may behave under different 
future scenarios; (iii) identify policy and planning requirements under 
different future scenarios; and (iv) stress test policies using the scenarios 
(see next reason below) (GOS, 2017). They may also be used to explore 
and identify signals of how the future may be unfolding to help poli-
cymakers respond to change as it happens (Pillkahn, 2008). 
To test the robustness of policies: scenarios can be used to ‘stress test’ 
policies, investment plans and interventions (courses of action), by 
indicating how well they perform across a range of future scenarios. 
Rather than identifying the optimum policy, investment or intervention 
in one scenario (the approach used in more traditional appraisal 
methods), the aim is to identify policies, investments and interventions 
that are ‘robust’ or ‘resilient’ across a range of scenarios. Such analysis is 
often undertaken qualitatively using ‘wind-tunnelling’ approaches 
where stakeholders discuss and rate how different courses of action 
perform in different scenarios or across different measures of success 
across scenarios (GOS, 2017)1. 
4.3. Who should be involved in developing scenarios, how and why? 
Scenario planning processes can “change the way decision makers 
[see] the world” (Menzies and Middleton, 2020: 43). They can be 
particularly powerful when used by strategy makers to create new pat-
terns of thinking across an organisation (Curry and Schultz, 2009). This 
can enable decisions to be based on “a wider, more informed point of 
view” (Menzies and Middleton, 2020: 43). 
The primary actors involved should be those who will most likely use 
the outputs (GOS, 2017). This will ensure that relevant insight is 
generated and ultimately that the outputs will be owned and put into 
practice (McBride et al., 2017). 
Scenario planning processes usually involve experts (those offering 
specific insight to the topic) and stakeholders (those who are affected by 
or who can affect a decision or action). Experts and stakeholders can 
have “competing needs, motivations, and cultures that must be 
balanced” (McBride et al., 2017: 4). Stakeholders may find it challenging 
to participate if their interests and strategic priorities conflict with the 
nature of the project or the emerging scenarios (Wright et al., 2019). 
Likewise, experts may make incorrect or biased assumptions based on 
their views and experience that could skew judgements made when 
creating scenarios (Wright et al., 2019). Scenario planning processes 
create a healthy environment within which to tackle these challenges - 
enabling the examination of whether strategic objectives are robust 
(GOS, 2017). 
The diversity of participants has an impact on the quality of the 
participatory process. A diverse range of perspectives helps open up 
discussions on what is plausible in the future (Urueña, 2019). There is 
therefore great value in extending scenario planning processes beyond 
the usual subject experts to include those who are often excluded. 
To design successful inclusive participatory scenario planning pro-
cesses, the following is recommended: 
1 Such analysis can also be undertaken quantitatively (Marchau et al. 2019). 
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• have an appreciation of the value of participants’ time, striking a 
balance between what can be expected of them and the quality of 
outputs sought;  
• establish strong and clear links between the outputs of scenario 
development and decision making (McBride et al., 2017);  
• carry out active and sustained engagement throughout the scenario 
planning process (McBride et al., 2017) – this is essential to develop 
ownership and confidence over the scenarios;  
• ensure that the process enables participants to openly challenge and 
critique the emerging scenarios (Wright et al., 2019);  
• undertake scenario orientation to familiarise participants fully with 
the scenarios themselves and the process undertaken to produce 
them (Wright et al., 2019); and 
• design efficient, enjoyable, and fully collaborative participatory ex-
periences – this is easier than ever using digital collaboration and 
communication tools. 
4.4. How is the scope of a set of scenarios clarified? 
What world should a set of scenarios describe? Typically, they can be 
described along three dimensions: time, space, and system (though note 
also van Notten et al. (2003) for distinction between issue-based, area- 
based and institution-based scenarios). They look forward over a period 
of time, typically between 10 and 50 years. They have a geographical 
range (city, region, country, continent, planet); and they define a system 
or a sector. This last element is the most difficult part of the framing 
process. Getting the scope (or domain) right at the outset of scenario 
development helps “avoid the explosion of the domain later” (Hines and 
Bishop, 2013: 33). 
In terms of time, it is not necessary to be precise about the number of 
years into the future (though sometimes this is done to align with pol-
icymaking requirements) - the number of decades is often sufficient 
granularity. If the timeframe is too short, typically below 10 years, there 
is the risk of extrapolation (Pillkahn, 2008), and the risk, especially in 
organisational settings, that the process will be influenced by current 
strategic priorities; meanwhile “the probability of significant change 
and uncertainty increases as the time horizon gets longer” (Hines and 
Bishop, 2013: 34). In terms of engagement or communications, framing 
the project around a particular year (2030, 2040, 2050 etc.) can increase 
impact. 
Geographical range tends to be a function of organisational span 
(McBride et al., 2017). A multinational company may prefer global 
scenarios; scenarios for a national agency will likely focus on its country. 
If there are questions about scale, it is better to go wider than narrower: 
it is possible to use a set of scenarios to interrogate a sub-system of the 
scenarios, but not to interrogate a super-system. 
The question of defining sector or system is the most difficult deci-
sion to make in the scoping or framing phase. Much of the intuitive 
logics2 literature refers to understanding the “decision focus” at the start 
of the scenarios process (for example, Schwartz and Ogilvy, 1998; and 
Wilson, 1998). This is based on approaches developed initially by SRI 
and built on by Global Business Network. Schwartz states that “[w]hen 
developing scenarios… begin with a specific decision or issue [emphasis 
added], then build out towards the environment” (Schwartz, 1996: 241). 
In the experience of the present authors, this focus leads to scenarios that 
are too narrow to produce useful outcomes. Who knows, after all, if that 
decision will still be meaningful when set in a larger or longer-term 
context? Following Donald Schon (1983), the purpose of scenarios 
should be problem-setting, not problem-solving. 
Defining the system is a challenge; it often takes time. One rule of 
thumb is that it needs to be larger than the immediate system of concern. 
Two of this paper’s authors were involved in defining the scope for the 
UK Foresight project on Intelligent Infrastructure Systems (OST, 2006), 
which developed scenarios for transport five decades into the future. 
The obvious system was “the future of mobility”, which covered multiple 
modes, individual and group, personal and commercial, private and 
public. In discussion with the advisory group, this was up-framed to “the 
future of access”, which included both digital and physical access, and 
also transport deliveries to the home. 
Such wider framing can cause anxiety among project sponsors that 
the project will take them to a set of futures but fail to bring them back to 
what they need to do now. But as Pierre Wack (Kahane, 2012: 45) notes, 
scenario development and planning processes involve “breathing in” 
and “breathing out”. Breathing in develops a rich understanding of the 
possible future landscape, breathing out identifies the implications. One 
way to make this visible, and allay anxiety, is to break the overall project 
question into two parts, addressing these two phases separately. 
4.5. Do scenarios have to be tailored to a particular application? 
As identified in Section 3, there are many examples of sets of sce-
narios that have been developed specifically for the application of 
concern. Yet there are also examples where previously prepared sce-
narios are used instead (e.g. Chatterjee and Gordon, 2006, also 
mentioned in Section 3). 
The DfT’s Uncertainty Toolkit identifies six draft Common Analytical 
Scenarios (CASs): High Economy; Low Economy; Regional; Behaviour 
Change; Technology; and Decarbonisation (DfT, 2021). These are intended 
(once published in final form) to be ‘off-the-shelf’ scenarios to be used in 
different applications and by different authorities. In so doing: (i) the 
resource requirements for applying scenario planning are lowered; and 
(ii) greater consistency is possible in the treatment of uncertainty in 
appraisal of major schemes and the development of transport policies 
and strategies. While set to be required for major schemes; a local au-
thority developing a small transport scheme may also wish to use the 
CASs (or another generic set of scenarios) as a basis for its exploratory 
work. The CASs are designed for modelling purposes in quantitative 
form but narrative representations of them could also be introduced and 
used. 
Proportionality is key when considering the extent to which scenario 
planning should: (i) (only) use pre-prepared scenarios; (ii) tailor pre- 
prepared scenarios further to a particular application; or (iii) develop 
a new set of scenarios tailored to a particular purpose. A key benefit of 
developing tailored scenarios (whether from pre-prepared scenarios or 
as a new set of scenarios) is the richness and quality of conversation and 
discussion that can be generated by them and therefore the subsequent 
improvements in robust decision-making. Also, as noted in Section 4.4, 
time, space and system dimensions of scope should be considered in 
determining the scenarios needed. 
The DfT’s Uncertainty Toolkit states the following. “Due to the va-
riety of uncertainty which may be relevant to individual investment 
proposals, it may be proportionate for schemes to develop their own 
analytical scenarios. These would focus around the additional un-
certainties that may be important to their scheme. These should be in 
addition to the Common Analytical Scenarios, and depend on the impact 
level of the scheme” (DfT, 2021: 26). A cautionary note, perhaps perti-
nent to the CASs, is sounded by Wilkinson and Kupers (2013), as follows. 
“Scenarios have a limited shelf life. As they become familiar, the 
temptation arises to cling to them—which risks thinking within, rather 
than looking beyond, the box. Generating new scenarios on an ongoing 
basis counters the tendency to hold on to familiar ones”. 
2 The term ‘intuitive logics’ is used to describe “a plausibility-based approach 
that enables participants, usually within a workshop setting, to create narra-
tives that describe unfolding chains of causation, which resolve themselves into 
sets of distinct future outcomes, usually four” (Derbyshire and Wright, 2017: 
255). The intuitive logics approach is the most commonly applied approach to 
scenario development. 
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4.6. How far should the bounds of future possibility be stretched? 
The futures literature, as noted earlier, makes a distinction between 
probable, possible and preferred scenarios. Scenarios lie in the category of 
the possible: they travel in sets of multiple futures. The literature also 
refers extensively to plausible futures (Spaniol and Rowland, 2019) 
although ‘plausible’ is rarely defined (which may explain the commu-
nicative appeal of Fig. 1′s conceptual distinction between probable, 
plausible and possible futures). Voros described, rather expansively, 
plausible futures as “those [futures] which “could happen” (i.e. they are 
not excluded) according to our current knowledge (as opposed to future 
knowledge) of how things work” (Voros, 2003: 17). 
However, Schultz (2015), who contests the value of ‘plausibility’ as 
an assessment criterion, traces the term’s use to futures practice. As 
Schultz notes, the notion of plausibility limits the range of scenarios to 
“the subjective capability and state of knowledge of the viewer” 
(Schultz, 2015); it becomes a criterion that is bounded by the cultural 
constraints of the organisation or sector, and restricts the ability of 
participants to challenge their own world views. 
As McBride et al. (2017, 7) note, “[t]he tendency of people to 
perceive the future as being largely like the past (Bryson et al. 2016), 
however, means that relying on preconceptions of what is plausible can 
be problematic (Ramírez and Selin 2014)”. In such circumstances, 
“plausibility becomes a socially-negotiated framing of what is seen as 
broadly reasonable”. In turn, this becomes a barrier to the process of “re- 
perceiving” (Wack, 1985a; Wack, 1985b) - yet this is one of the desired 
outcomes of scenarios work. 
Testing possible scenarios against notions of plausibility can also 
prevent the work from stretching thinking and widening the sense of 
what might be considered plausible in the future (McBride et al., 2017). 
A scenario from the 2010s about 2020 in which countries closed down 
swathes of their economies for health reasons would have failed a 
typical ‘plausibility’ test. 
However, it is important that a given scenario is coherent - that the 
world it describes hangs together as a system. Some practitioners 
recommend the use of reinforcing and balancing loops from systems 
thinking as a method to test for coherence (Hodgson and Sharpe, 2007). 
It is also important that within the overall set of scenarios the individual 
scenarios are distinctively different from one another. One of the at-
tractions of the 2x2 approach is that the double uncertainties create this 
distinctiveness through the underlying structure. 
The desired outcome, then, is a set of collectively distinctive and 
individually coherent scenarios that stretch thinking about a system or 
sector and open up new insights about its possible evolution, along with 
new questions about opportunities and risks. As with much futures 
work, this becomes a question of judgment - judgment that improves 
with practice. 
4.7. How many scenarios and how many variables are needed to create 
scenarios? 
Amer et al. (2013) undertook a review of several scenario studies and 
specifically addressed the question of the appropriate number of sce-
narios, and approaches for developing scenarios. They found that most 
futurists and researchers recommend the use of three or more scenarios, 
but not more than five. Fewer than three scenarios are not advised 
because one single scenario does not allow for alternative options and 
two scenarios will usually reflect extreme situations. On the other hand, 
more than five scenarios will increase costs (of designing, drafting nar-
ratives, communication of the scenarios etc.) and will increase the 
complexity of their use in terms of evaluating policies. Cognitive over-
load can be a real problem, with consideration of too many scenarios 
feeling “unnecessarily complicated and the impacts difficult to untan-
gle” which can result “in a large volume of analysis that is difficult to 
absorb” (ITF, Thompson and Jamotta, 2015: 20). 
The number of scenarios used can also be affected by whether they 
are considered quantitatively instead of, or as well as, qualitatively (see 
Section 4.5 for reference to DfT’s six scenarios (intended for quantitative 
representation and modelling (DfT, 2021)); and Section 3 for reference 
to Transport for the North’s four scenarios (TfN, 2020) and Transport 
Scotland’s eight scenarios (Ruscoe et al., 2019), both represented 
qualitative and quantitatively). 
There is more variation in terms of how many variables should be 
considered in scenarios, and indeed in how such variables are described. 
Terms such as ‘drivers’, ‘drivers of change’, ‘factors’ and ‘critical un-
certainties’ are often used. The number of variables is very much linked 
to the scenario development approach (see Section 4.8) and the 
complexity of the system under consideration. 
The 2x2 approach focuses on what are deemed to be the two most 
important and most uncertain variables (called critical uncertainties) to 
define the scenarios (for an example see Fig. 2). The approach is often 
criticised on the basis that it is difficult to describe complex environ-
ments using only two variables, that the approach may oversimplify the 
situation or environment, and that researchers may miss critical system 
variables (Amer et al., 2013). Nevertheless, it is also emphasised that 
many of these variables can be built into the resulting scenario narra-
tives (i.e. the two critical uncertainties are used to define the ‘wire 
frames’ for the scenarios and further variables then provide additional 
colour in the ‘storytelling’). The 2x2 approach can be more appropriate 
for exploring specific questions or less complex environments. It can also 
appeal in terms of ease of use in thinking and planning because of the (a) 
symmetry of representation of uncertainty. 
Alternative approaches may use 3–8, or even more, framing vari-
ables. These approaches may be more appropriate in more complex 
environments - such as exploring future transport - incorporating de-
mographic and economic factors, as well as a range of new technologies 
and behaviours. In such approaches, tools like morphological analysis, 
cross impact analysis and consistency analysis may be used in scenarios 
development (Amer et al., 2013). Approaches that use more variables 
may require software support (Gausemeier et al., 1998). These tools are 
discussed in further detail in the next Section. 
4.8. How are the scenarios developed? 
Creation of explorative scenarios can involve an inductive process to 
develop scenarios organically. This starts from plot or systemic elements 
relevant to the particular subject of study. The approach that is much 
more commonly seen and recognisable across many transport examples 
is a deductive process (McBride et al., 2017). In this, the scenario 
structure shapes the content. 
In the deductive approach, drivers of change (variables) affecting the 
future area of interest are typically identified. The PESTLE framework – 
see Fig. 3 – is often used to guide identification of variables of interest 
(for subsequent prioritisation). Alternatively, STEEP is used (wherein 
‘Legal’ is, if considered relevant, addressed through the lens of ‘Politi-
cal’). The number of variables identified can be substantial. 
Variables are then prioritised according to their importance (impact) 
as well as according to the degree of uncertainty regarding their future 
state. For example, if the future of interest is public transport provision, 
then variables such as attitudes to climate change, prevalence of flexible 
working and of driverless cars (that affect passenger demand) may be 
considered both highly important (impactful) and uncertain. 
Determination of relative importance of variables is often done 
initially in a workshop setting (and may be informed by cross-impact 
analysis, as discussed below). A manageable number of chosen vari-
ables must be decided upon to form the basis for defining scenarios. This 
can be dealt with through the 2x2 approach (described earlier) or a 
morphological approach (Börjeson et al., 2006) can be used that caters 
for three or more key variables. The morphological approach is “a 
structured method for ensuring consistency and relevance in scenario 
development” (Johansen, 2018: 116). It involves most or all of the 
following steps (also benefitting from substantial interaction with 
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stakeholders and experts):  
1. Cross-impact analysis – This involves identifying those variables that 
have the highest shaping potential in the system of interest. It is 
undertaken by specifying the assumed impact of each variable on all 
of the other variables being considered in the scenario assessment (in 
a pairwise fashion). The result of this analysis is an influence matrix 
(Gausemeier et al., 1998) which allows a variable’s importance to be 
considered according to the extent to which it impacts upon and is 
impacted by the other variables. This information can be used to 
develop a short-list of the most impactful variables in the system.  
2. Variable projections – Each variable, by virtue of its uncertainty, will 
have a range of possible future states (high/medium/low; dispersed/ 
concentrated; growth/stagnation/decline etc.). A matter of judge-
ment, the number of future states will be at least two but may be 
three or even four or five (depending on views about how the future 
may unfold).  
3. Consistency analysis – For a scenario to be credible, the combination 
of variable projections of which it is to be comprised must be able to 
reasonably coexist. For example, it is reasonable that high demand 
for public transport could sit alongside low fares, but high demand 
for public transport may not be consistent with high growth in 
driverless cars. Consistency analysis takes each pairing of variables 
and judges the relative consistency of each possible pair of 
projections. 
4. Cluster analysis – In studies with large numbers of variables, com-
puter software is available to use the outputs from the consistency 
analyses to identify bundles of consistent projections across all var-
iables (eliminating bundles with inconsistent projections) (Gause-
meier et al., 1998). However, there can be a very large number of 
consistent bundles across all the variables and therefore cluster 
analysis is undertaken to identify clusters of bundles with similar 
projections. The different clusters become the basis of the scenarios. 
The number of scenarios will depend on how different the different 
projection bundles are and the complexity of the future situation; 
and is less influenced by the “habits of the scenario team” (Gause-
meier et al., 1998). 
These then become the outline scenarios that can then be fleshed out 
(see Section 4.9 below). 
Such morphological analysis can enhance the quality of and confi-
dence in the scenario development. It is time consuming and mentally 
demanding. The ‘spirit’ of this approach can be applied more rapidly and 
less systematically. If this is done, the resulting projection bundles are 
still likely to represent credible scenarios, though they may not reflect as 
well the extent of uncertainty that exists or support as much divergence 
of thinking. 
4.9. How is a scenario brought to life? 
Having determined the outline scenarios, there is a need to add 
colour and bring them to life. This is an art as much as a science (as we 
reiterate further below). For a recent example of what is produced, 
please see TfN (2020). Before embarking on this it is important to 
consider the following questions:  
1. Who will ultimately find these scenarios useful and therefore who is 
your audience?  
2. How can you make them useful and usable for this audience?  
3. How can you help make sure that your audience uses them in 
practice?  
4. What are the critical issues and messages each scenario must 
communicate to your audience? 
Ultimately the scenarios will help their audience to consider how 
they might “thrive and survive, or wilt and die” (Wright et al., 2019:10) 
within each future. While some scenarios can appear more dystopian 
and others more utopian, it is important to recognise that there are 
Fig. 3. Illustrative drivers of change (variables) using PESTLE framework.  
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winners and losers likely in most if not all scenarios and that different 
beholders of the scenarios will view their relative appeal differently. For 
explorative purposes, scenarios should reflect “tales of possibility” 
(Chermack and Coons, 2012: 238). Scenario names should capture the 
essence of each future in a few words without implying prior judgement 
on each scenario in terms of appeal: the task in crafting and using such 
scenarios is not to identify preference but to explore future contexts for 
present-day decision making. 
Scenarios may have either a quantitative or qualitative nature, or 
both (as discussed earlier in the paper). Qualitative scenarios provide an 
accessible format for a range of audiences. They also provide an outlet 
for creative expression that can really help to describe the elements of a 
complex system in play – most commonly this is done within a scenario 
narrative, but could also be in the form of a visualisation or other forms 
of multimedia (such as a video). 
Writing a narrative is not always a straightforward process due to the 
wealth of input, content and ideas generated from the participatory 
process. A degree of imagination is required to create insightful and 
meaningful scenario narratives. As Einstein noted “Fantasy is more 
important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited, while fantasy en-
compasses the entire world.” (Pillkahn, 2008: 185). When we tap into 
our imagination, we can open our minds to what is possible in the future 
rather than being restricted to thinking only about the present. Our 
imaginations allow us to write scenarios from a future perspective, 
supported by information generated from workshops to reflect the 
plausible theory of change for how the future developed in this manner. 
Chermack and Coons provide an example of an article devoted to 
elaborating on how to “write the scenario stories” (Chermack and Coons, 
2012: 234), having noted the paucity of such available guidance. They 
note how “[s]cenario planning is part art, part craft, part science, and 
part process” (Chermack and Coons, 2012: 235) before setting out 
advice on crafting scenarios. Importantly, a considerable part of the 
effort comes from the preceding steps and assessment of insights from 
these steps that form part of the ‘breathing in’ stage of preparation for 
crafting. In then creating narratives, the author must guard against bias 
from their own mental models by seeking feedback from other partici-
pants. A key challenge is to be able to generate “believable ideas about 
things that have not happened” (Chermack and Coons, 2012: 245). 
Learning ultimately comes from doing. 
In the creation and communication of scenarios and their narratives, 
there is benefit increasingly available through digital tools. We have 
found the use of the digital collaboration tool Miro3 very effective for 
exploring and communicating the entire process and culmination of 
scenario development (and in turn scenario planning). Within the digital 
space tools such as role-play and voting can be creatively used to allow 
people to let their guard down and really connect with others when 
thinking about the future worlds that they are co-creating or making 
sense of. It is often valuable to remind participants themselves that 
scenario development is as much an art as a science, and that judging 
credibility and consistency is more relevant than notions of right or 
wrong. 
4.10. How much time and effort are needed for scenario development? 
There is no absolute answer to the scale of resource input to scenario 
development and planning. Part of the appeal of using scenarios is how 
flexible their development can be in terms of time and resource 
requirements. 
As previously mentioned, it is possible to use already published 
scenarios as the context for a conversation about the uncertainty sur-
rounding a small transport scheme. This approach is undoubtedly time 
and resource efficient but may diminish the credibility of the scenarios 
work and its potential to support and influence thinking and decision 
making around the specific issues for a project. 
Overall, judgement is needed when deciding whether pre-prepared 
(published) scenarios, rather than tailored scenarios are sufficient for 
robust decision making. Schemes with higher impacts, greater revenue 
risk and more uncertain outcomes require more tailoring of scenarios to 
ensure uncertainty is considered sufficiently (DfT, 2021). 
As a guide to time requirements, the GO-Science Futures Toolkit 
describes a process of scenario development that takes approximately 
one day of face-to-face workshops (GOS, 2017). Yet, in practice, time 
requirements for activities can vary considerably (Dator, 2009). For 
large and complex systems and schemes, there are a multitude of tasks 
and activities involved in the scenario planning process. As a result, 
projects can be conducted across multiple workshops with some work-
shops running over consecutive days or scheduled over a period of 
weeks or months (McBride et al., 2017). 
The authors of this paper have found that online workshops using 
digital whiteboard approaches have optimised scenario development in 
terms of time and quality. “[O]nline offers the potential to increase the 
volume and diversity of participation” and improvements have been 
observed in participant interaction (Wright et al., 2019: 14). 
In summary, “[d]eveloping plausible and nuanced scenarios is time- 
consuming” (McBride et al., 2017: 4) but, the use of already published 
scenarios offers opportunity to save time whilst still helping to accom-
modate uncertainty in decision making. The amount of time and effort 
that should be expended on scenario development should be propor-
tionate to the purpose for which the scenarios are being developed. 
5. Contemplating the future 
The exploration of the ten questions above is intended to help 
demystify what lies within the field of scenario development and plan-
ning as applied in the transport sector. At the same time, it illustrates 
how many important considerations need to be addressed if application 
is to be fruitful. We hope this serves to support the ongoing and shared 
endeavour of learning by doing as we face the need for decision making 
under deep uncertainty in transport planning, policymaking and 
investment. 
In contemplating the future it is important to be honest about how 
well we understand and acknowledge uncertainty. We are living in a 
world that is in a state of flux – shaken by the global shock of COVID-19 
but in any case subject to a multiplicity of political, economic, social, 
technological, legal and environmental dynamics. Feeling deeply un-
certain is legitimate. As the French Philosopher Voltaire (1694–1778) 
reportedly said, “uncertainty is an uncomfortable position, but certainty 
is an absurd one”. Ignorance of the challenges surrounding transport 
planning, and continuing with business as usual approaches to policy-
making and investment is increasingly untenable. 
The fact that futures-based tools and processes such as scenario 
planning are available should be welcomed and embraced and it is 
indeed grounds for encouragement that they are moving from the pe-
riphery into becoming more normalised contributions to mainstream 
transport planning. The DfT’s recent publication of its Uncertainty 
Toolkit presents the latest example of readily available and open source 
tools designed for transport practitioners. 
Much as we would caution use of the word ‘revolution’ to describe 
change in the transport system over time, so too can we expect to see a 
more evolutionary rather than revolutionary change in the practice of 
transport planning when it comes to scenario planning. Awareness, 
knowledge and experience are growing and may continue to do so over 
time. We advocate a learning by doing philosophy and this is apparent in 
national and international networks of academics and practitioners who 
are sharing insights and experience with mutual interest in improving 
the application of scenario planning. The Decision Making Under 
3 http://www.miro.com 
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Uncertainty Society4 is an example (not limited to the transport sector) 
of a network set up with this in mind. The International Transport 
Forum, at the time of writing, has a working group examining decision 
making under uncertainty (within which this paper’s first author is 
involved) and is reporting on this in 2021. 
Perhaps one of the greatest challenges in handling uncertainty re-
mains engagement and communication. Scenario planning must be able 
to deliver decision making support to which decision makers themselves 
are receptive. Scenarios can be powerful for communicating a range of 
challenges and opportunities, but how can we improve their appeal to 
wider audiences, thus increasing their impact? We are keen to explore 
more of the potential to visualise scenarios through illustrations and 
animations as well as the relationship between narrative and numbers in 
depicting futures. 
We are also keen to share in future more of our evolving insights into 
the experience of using scenarios directly in support of transport poli-
cymaking (scenario planning) as distinct from the process of creating 
and representing the scenarios themselves (scenario development). 
With such unprecedented grand challenges as the climate emergency 
it is crucial that transport planning is able to connect with the policy-
makers and transport users it ultimately supports, and to communicate 
an understanding of future possibilities. 
We hope this paper helps inspire and encourage others to become 
ever more actively involved in the transport planning evolution in which 
thinking about the future using scenario planning is set to be increas-
ingly significant. 
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